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The Ghost in the Legal Machine: Algorithmic Governmentality, Economy, and 
the Practice of Law 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper investigates algorithmic governmentality - as proposed by 
Antoinette Rouvroy – specifically in relation to law. It seeks to show how algorithmic 
profiling can be particularly attractive for those in legal practice, given restraints on time 
and resources. It deviates from Rouvroy in two ways. Firstly, it argues that algorithmic 
governmentality does not contrast with neoliberal modes of government, in that it allows 
indirect rule through economic calculations. Secondly, that critique of such systems is 
possible, especially if the creative nature of law can be harnessed effectively. 
Design/methodology/approach - This is a conceptual paper, with a theory-based 
approach, that is intended to explore relevant issues related to algorithmic 
governmentality as a basis for future empirical research. It builds on governmentality 
and socio-legal studies, as well as research on algorithmic practices and some 
documentary analysis of reports and public-facing marketing of relevant technologies. 
Findings – This paper provides insights on how algorithmic knowledge is collected, 
constructed, and applied in different situations. It gives examples of how algorithms are 
currently used, and also how trends are developing. It demonstrates how such uses can 
be informed by socio-political and economic rationalities.  
Research limitations – Further ethnographic research is required to test the theoretical 
findings.  
Originality/value - This paper takes up Rouvroy’s question of whether we are at the 
end(s) of critique, and seeks to identify where such critique can be made possible. It 
also highlights the importance of acknowledging the role of political rationalities in 
informing the activity of algorithmic assemblages. 
Introduction 
Algorithmic governmentality is a term coined by Antoinette Rouvroy (2012) to describe 
new regimes of power brought forward by the ‘computational turn’, and the ever-
increasing prevalence of algorithms in daily life. Popular applications include the 
structuring of social media timelines, the provision of tailored music and film 
recommendations, and the filtering and dissemination of news articles. Each of these 
applications shares a common theme, in that they bring a structured order to the chaos 
of the online world - so that information becomes more easily digestible and manageable 
for the everyday user.  
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However, algorithms also enable the profiling of these same users through data-mining 
practices, thus allowing a form of financial risk management aiming at “minimizing the 
uncertainty associated to human agency” (p.10). In this manner then, the chaos of 
worldly potentialities also becomes ordered and more easily digestible for those charged 
with the tasks of governing and decision-making, whether accurate or not (and if not, 
this threatens potentially dire consequences for the profiled individual).  Algorithms are 
not fussy about whom they work for.  
This paper focuses on a specific definition of ‘governmentality’ given by Foucault, and 
subsequent scholars. I will also attempt to demarcate points of differentiation between 
Rouvroy’s thought, and my own, so as to prevent any confusion.  
Foucault (2008, p. 186) describes the ‘art of government’ as the way in which one 
“conducts the conduct of men” or endeavours to “shape, guide or direct” the conduct of 
others (Rose, 1999, p.15). Miller and Rose (2008, p.15-16) have split this into two 
aspects: the first being rationalities, mentalities or “styles of thinking, ways of rendering 
reality thinkable in such a way that it [becomes] amenable to calculation and 
programming”, which are rational in the sense that they privilege “systematic ways of 
thinking”, such as the languages of economics and management, “over symbolic, 
mythical or poetic modes” (Dean, 2010, p.25); and the second, of human technologies 
or “assemblages of persons, techniques, institutions, instruments for the conducting of 
conduct.” This article places algorithms firmly within the second aspect, as instruments 
of government, which hold the potential for distinctive effect based upon the 
governmental rationality with which they are employed, and the assemblages they are 
situated within.  
This paper looks at one particular concept which has become more prominent in recent 
times, and relies on algorithms in order to work effectively: big data. Big data is at the 
forefront of aforementioned algorithmic risk management techniques, which enact what 
Antoinette Rouvroy (2012, p.143) refers to as data-behaviourism, or new ways of 
“producing knowledge [about future events] without considering the subject’s 
psychological motivations, speeches or narratives, but rather relying on data.”  
Once this knowledge is collated and organised, it can be acted upon due to the belief in 
its ‘objective’ value. Certain areas have become particularly amenable to such practices, 
including online advertising, personal insurance, health (as evidenced by both the 
concepts of quantified self and genomics, whereby data scientists such as Jeff 
Hammerbacher seek to make medicine an “information game” (Lohr 2015, p. 163-164)), 
and crucially to this specific article, law and legal knowledge.  
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Nevertheless, this paper takes a step away from Rouvroy’s contention that algorithmic 
governmentality “contrasts with what we know about a neoliberal mode of government 
which produces the subjects it needs” (p.8). On the contrary, algorithms represent the 
ideal tools for a neoliberal form of economic management, entailing what Miller and Rose 
refer to as government at a distance (2008, p.16).  
In addition, while Rouvroy is not interested in “whether algorithms produce ‘valid’ 
predictions or not” (p.143), this article argues that it is crucial to make any inaccuracies 
within algorithmic systems clear, so as to form the basis of critique. As algorithms 
become more prominent in legal systems, the creative nature of law is crucial in forming 
these critiques, so that the ghost in the legal machine (meaning here the discrete 
artificial ‘intelligence’ attributed to algorithms), is taken with a large pinch of salt – and 
the unintentional ‘lock-in’ of socio-legal norms can be prevented.  
This paper is separated into five sections: The first provides a working definition for big 
data, to provide clarity in understanding; the second describes some of the practices 
involved in data collection for algorithmic techniques; the third deals directly with the 
process of algorithmic knowledge production, and the contradictions involved; the fourth 
looks at how algorithms contribute to neoliberal modes of government, specifically in the 
area of criminal justice; the fifth section discusses the dangers of allowing technological 
developments in the common law to drift by, without harnessing the creative nature of 
the law, to enable critique; and finally, a section of conclusions summarise what has 
been set out beforehand, limitations of this research as a conceptual paper, and suggest 
areas for future research.  
 
What is ‘big data'? 
As Kitchin (2014, p.68) has stated, there is little consensus on the definition of big data, 
but some major themes are generally applicable: volume, velocity and variety. In other 
words, big data refers to the collection of massive data sets so quickly, and complex in 
variety, that traditional forms of analysis are insufficient. To make sense of these, 
intricate algorithms are applied that have the ability to carry out ‘bottom-up’ learning 
through data-mining processes, thus allowing emergent conclusions to be made, that are 
not necessarily immediately visible to a human analyst (Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010, 
p.431-432).  
Through apps, websites and even home appliances with the Internet of Things - an 
emerging technology sector where data collection is ubiquitous (Weber and Weber, 
2010, p.1) and ‘pervasive’ (Matzner, 2014, p.94) - we give up vast amounts of data 
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each day to companies to which this data is so valuable, it can become part of their 
schedule of assets should they become bankrupt (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2015, p.50).  
Algorithms are useful marketing tools because they allow categorisation of users into 
profiles using big data sets, based on the identification of present preferences and 
anticipation of future purchasing possibilities (Rouvroy, 2012, p.151). But, there is no 
need for these profiles to be entirely accurate.  
For example, practices of ‘real-time bidding’, occur within the time it takes to load a 
webpage (Marshall, 2014). Here, interactions take place between algorithms of a 
webpage (e.g. a search engine), and those of multiple advertisers (using an 
intermediary), trading user information through profiles (supposedly linked to a user’s 
interests) and requesting bids for advertisement impressions. This process is automated, 
taking place in milliseconds, with minimal human involvement, and aims to improve 
efficiency and reduce budget wastage in the online advertisement industry. But as 
discussed above, the accuracy of the preferences generated is not a primary concern.  
To work from assumptions is enough - as data brokers continue to make profits - while 
their clients can succeed in promoting their brand through ‘impressions’, even if the 
targeted user’s interests do not directly align with a specific advertisement. Therefore in 
this instance, it could be seen as a logical stance for a company to sacrifice the promise 
of greater accuracy - provided by a more expensive marketing service - in favour of the 
relatively lower costs of a rival.   
Either way, the ability of algorithms to govern activity by directing attention to specific 
brands - and to shape behavioural patterns of consumption - is on display. It is an 
autonomic algorithmic market, operating within a German ordoliberal-like formalised 
framework of ‘pure competition’ (Foucault, 2008, p.131); a specimen of unabridged 
efficacy. 
Real-time bidding is a process which requires little human intervention, produces quick 
results, and certain users are likely to be appreciative of it. It is simple and it works. 
However problems arise when an effort is made to replicate this algorithmic competence, 
and apply similar market principles to areas which require much more human 
involvement. For example, credit and insurance companies may use algorithms as a 
form of financial decision-support, or they may be deployed within the criminal justice 
system to enable resource and time management programmes.  
These are organisations of which the public would expect nothing less than the most 
stringent of due diligence, before acting upon certain data. Nonetheless, data collection 
continues, and belief in the objective efficacy of algorithms persists, despite questions 
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over accuracy. In the next two sections, this paper will focus on how data is collected, 
and why algorithms ‘work’, in turn, before moving towards the use of algorithms in 
public decision making.  
 
How is big data collected? 
Big data techniques aim to gain the largest sample size possible, thereby dwarfing the 
levels of traditional data analysis capabilities. Kitchin (2014, p.72) has referred to them 
as being ‘exhaustive in scope’ or aiming for ‘n=all’.  
Exhaustive should be taken to have two further meanings. Firstly, data is a by-product of 
digital technologies that log transactions, usage, interactions and more, particularly with 
technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT represents the amalgamation of 
progress in the areas of smart sensors, network technologies and data analytics, by 
allowing standalone objects such as vehicles become part of wider online assemblages - 
where data is continually exchanged between objects (Stackowiak et al, 2015, p.20). A 
person’s driving patterns could be therefore be recorded and subsumed into a totalised 
network of connectivity, including smart phone and smart grid data. 
Here we see a shift from liberal forms of ‘biopolitical’ governance, or “politics concerning 
the administration of life” (Dean, 2010, p.117), meaning that the conduct being 
‘conducted’ is not only that of human life, but also of hardware, software and mechanical 
vehicles (especially with driverless cars etc.). Notwithstanding this, neoliberal values 
remain intact, because the results produced can still be used to apply market principles 
to non-market areas, albeit with an increased focus on behavioural prediction.  
The second meaning is that data is often treated as wastage; or as fumes leaving the 
exhaust to be forgotten about. Privacy policies are accepted without being read, and 
rights are handed over without due consideration, in order to access ‘free’ services.  
It is estimated that more than one thousand apps are added to Apple’s app store every 
day (Mathew, 2015), and similarly, the Google Play store almost doubled from one 
million total apps to 1.8 million between July 2013 and November 2015 (Statista, 2016). 
Many users install a few ‘throw-away’ apps each week, only to delete them again within 
a few days. In the meantime, these apps may have been able to harvest a significant 
amount of personal data through general usage. 
Privacy policies usually involve five typical kinds of request, including: location data, 
camera or media file access, contact information, web history, and access to social 
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media interactions such as friend lists, likes and posts (Olmstead and Atkinson, 2015). 
Not providing these may be a barrier to use.  
For a user to simply refuse to use any service asking for egregious permissions is 
unfortunately no longer a realistic option, because they are engrained in almost all 
aspects of the online world. Websites use cookies to track visitors, and browsers are 
tracked by developers and ISPs. Such pervasive tracking should no longer be a surprise, 
given the incentive for companies to take part in data brokerage. This is now a multi-
billion dollar industry, and one of the main drivers of the online economy, meaning the 
higher the volume of data, the better (Kitchin, 2014, p.18). Some may say that it would 
be silly on their part not to get involved.  
Brunton and Nissenbaum (2015, p.59) have compared opting out of such services as a 
form of digital ‘martyrdom’. Digital technologies, are now central tools of contemporary 
communication, and to isolate oneself from this is a difficult choice. Indeed, to try and 
make a balanced decision on when to opt in, is almost impossible as users are 
“uninformed, cognitively overwhelmed, and structurally ill-equipped to manage the vast 
information and myriad [of] decisions that privacy self-management requires” (Peppet, 
2014, p.160).  
Even where consent for collection is revoked, this does not bring a retrospective end to 
the storage of that data in certain jurisdictions. For example the ‘Third Party Doctrine’ in 
the U.S. builds from the Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States (1967) and 
states that there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy in data held by third parties”. 
There is therefore potentially no redress once a user has provided consent (Jackson et 
al., p.7). This ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ question lies at the heart of US data 
protection, thus informing and shaping legal interpretation of this issue, in a jurisdiction 
which represents the main hub of technological innovation for big data (Hildebrandt and 
Koops, 2010, p.442).   
The situation differs significantly in Europe. The upcoming General Data Protection 
Directive (GDPR) aims to increase user control over the processing of their data, by 
strengthening consent principles. But, the power of such rules is surely weakened by the 
impairment of informed choice, which is detrimental to the concept of ‘informational self-
determination’ (Noain Sanchez, 2015, p.126).  
With all this in mind, collection of personal usage data looks inescapable, unless one 
takes the famous approach of Henry Thoreau, and abandons society for a secluded 
cabin. Obviously this is not a realistic option for all, and data collection is a necessary 
condition for the use of digital technologies. Therefore, it is much more important that 
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we are able to understand how it is used, and why it is valued, in order to provide 
adequate critique.  
 
How does data come to be attributed ‘objectivity’ and economic value? 
a) Algorithmic Knowledge 
To govern requires knowledge (Miller and Rose, 2008, p.31). Algorithms play a specific 
part in knowledge production, because of the ‘relational’ character of big data (Kitchin, 
2014, p.72). The volume of data involved allows correlations between information 
collected by separate devices, previously difficult to bring together (Peppet, 2014, p.93). 
This is the crucial point to big data’s success, as “its value comes from the patterns that 
can be derived by making connections between pieces of data, about an individual, 
about individuals in relation to others, about groups of people, or simply about the 
structure of information itself” (boyd and Crawford, 2011, p.2). These patterns are 
constructed through the interpretation of the algorithms involved, and do not need to 
reflect a universal ‘truth’ in order to become actionable.    
Douglas Merrill, former Google CEO, now runs ZestFinance, a financial services company 
using big data for credit decisions and has stated, “All data is credit data, we just don’t 
know how to use it yet” (Peppet, 2014, p.27).  Such an analysis easily transfers across 
different sectors because of the ‘immediate operationality’ of big data techniques 
(Antoinette Rouvroy, 2012, p.148).  
The ‘intelligence’ of an algorithm is judged upon the efficiency it creates, and the 
economic fluidity it allows. This is justified by the rationality that an algorithm is merely 
objectively ‘crunching numbers’. However, the public presentation of this process can 
often obscure its clearly mathematical bases, as is demonstrated by IBM’s new ‘cognitive 
business’ initiative, adding a human face to the software.  
Information is taken to be a “spontaneous germination from digital transcription and the 
statistical analysis of ‘reality’” (Rouvroy, 2012, p.145). ‘Reality’ should be understood 
here in the sense used by Boltanski (2011), who contrasts a staged, calculated, form of 
reality, with the immanence of ‘the world’ in all its uncertainty (p. 58). This staged 
reality is constructed through algorithmic technologies that take the world - and its 
future - as their objects, and reform human (and non-human, with the IoT) potentialities 
as either programmes to execute or data to capture in turn (Henman, 2010, p.29) - in 
what Deleuze and Guatarri (1980) would refer to as a rigid “field of overcoding” (p.212). 
This is done with the hope of making the invisible ‘visible’ (Lohr, p.2). [1] 
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As a result, ‘raw’ data is taken to be knowledge discovered from the digital world rather 
than about the digital world (p.146). It becomes equated with the immanence of the 
‘lived world’, thus escaping critique of its calculated origins, and allowing the 
construction of a subjective (meaning the algorithm’s individual interpretation), staged 
reality; that is washed of this subjectivity when presented publicly. Frameworks of 
critique and protest become ‘inscribed’ in “established test formats and qualifications”, 
meaning systematic change becomes much more difficult (Boltanski, 2011, p.32). 
It is this characteristic which encourages Rouvroy, to argue that big data is the catalyst 
for new ‘truth regimes’ that frame socially acceptable and functional discourse (p.149), 
after the algorithmic results have been interpreted in such a way so that they fit with 
particular financial governance goals. This in turn structures the “possible field of action 
of others” (Lanci, 2015, p.106). Algorithmic interpretation facilitates what Boltanski 
(2011) refers to as grammars of reality: linguistic and material relations which organise 
and constitute reality itself. As Miller and Rose (2008, p.31) argue: 
The government of a population, a national economy, an enterprise, a family, a child or even 
oneself becomes possible only through discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be 
governed as an intelligible field with its own limits and characteristics, and whose component parts 
are linked together in some more or less systematic manner.  
This ‘domain to be governed’ is constructed by algorithms through their design, targets, 
interpretations, and the results they produce; while the ‘links’ between component parts 
and discursive mechanisms are established by the discourse of neoliberal (and other) 
mentalities of government.  
Boltanski’s definition is particularly useful, as it recognises the fragility of grammars, 
which can always be critiqued based on the inherent contradictions that arise from their 
attempt to construct a singular reality. If uncovered, this looks ‘arbitrary’ in comparison 
to the immanence of the world.   
The complex nature of algorithmic decisions can create significant opacity, leading 
human actors to take part in ‘blind deference’ to the machine’s decision, due to a belief 
that the answers they provide a transcendental truth, instead of a subjective one. David 
Lyon (2014, p.6) specifically uses the term automation to refer to this, by which he 
means the creation of a ‘human-algorithm’ relationship where trust is given to the 
relevant algorithms to establish and interpret correlations in a ‘routine’ manner. 
Influenced by a lack of comprehension of how the algorithm came to a specific 
conclusion (Zarsky, 2016, p.121), it may not be clear to someone affected by the 
decision of a credit rating algorithm, for example, that its reasoning could have been 
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flawed. The same could be said for a governmental actor allocating public funding based 
on an algorithmic cost-benefit analysis. Yet, these contradictions remain, and once they 
are made clear, it becomes difficult to return to this state of ‘blindness’. 
b) Algorithmic Contradictions  
Although big data techniques often set out with the aim of ‘n=all’, the data collected is 
still inherently a limited sample. It is a process of trial and error (Executive Office of the 
President, 2016, p. 18). When dealing with economically life-changing decisions such as 
for credit and insurance, the threat of discrimination is ever-present. Discrimination does 
not necessarily need to be equated with prejudice based on race, for instance. It could 
also be entirely unforeseen. To use a slightly frivolous example, an algorithm may decide 
that all viewers of Better Call Saul, who bought a suit online in the previous year, are 
lawyers and therefore able to afford higher health insurance, if further data is not 
available (Lohr, 2015, p.192-195; Sweeney, 2013). 
This is because of two typical assumptions underlying algorithmic decision making. 
Firstly, that initial training samples used for the models will accurately represent the 
future populations on which these will be applied (particularly in the case of supervised 
learning), and the second being that any samples taken are a good representation of the 
population involved (Calders and Zliobaité, 2012, p. 46), meaning that the data obtained 
is sufficient enough to create a full picture of each connected individual. 
Both of these assumptions are susceptible to error and bias, although that is precisely 
what they are intended to negate. If a large volume of data is collected but incomplete - 
and then acted upon - it is likely to result in unfair practices. When seeking a loan, 
insurance, or even a job, it is now possible that a person might be scrutinised based 
upon their data. This can give (possibly flawed) insights into their social interests, 
attention to personal health, sleep levels, and purchases. In turn, decision-makers may 
feel that they have enough context to determine the personality of the applicant, and 
their potential future choices, deeming them an economic risk or not (see Peppet, 2014). 
‘Usage-based insurance’ models are now on the rise (particularly in the UK), most 
notably fuelled by user data gathered from ‘telematic’ boxes in cars. Car insurance is a 
relatively ‘inoffensive’ testbed for algorithmic analysis, which may later spread to more 
complex areas such as health insurance - aided by concepts like the ‘quantified self’ - 
intended to break down one’s daily activities and biometric performance into quantities 
that can be graphically represented, and allow them to be improved upon. [2] 
Such decisions are based on normative reasoning and judgments attained from the 
correlations, and regularities, of ‘normal’ distribution and deviation of individual conduct. 
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The use of data facilitates a process of standardisation, encouraging ‘translatability’ into 
qualitative formations, based on perception of measurements and descriptions (Rose, 
1991, p.678), which in turn provides economic incentives to those deemed to be ‘low-
risk’ (i.e careful drivers). 
As Danaher (2016) notes, algorithms may not only remove human input from the 
private sector, but that there is a threat of algocracy - whereby algorithm-based systems 
could come to “structure and constrain the opportunities for human participation in, and 
comprehension of, public decision making.” (p.245). This is particularly worrying if we 
are not equipped to adequately critique the numerical bases of algorithmic 
governmentality, enabled by neoliberal modes of political governance. It is now possible 
to look how this is beginning to take shape more closely. 
 
Algorithmic government ‘at a distance’ 
Algorithms can be implemented by any political rationality for governance purposes, 
which always results in the ‘conduct of conduct’ – this being the essence of government 
in Foucault’s analysis. But one particular political rationality stands out in relation to 
algorithms: neoliberal governance. Specifically, algorithms are located in assemblages of 
what Miller and Rose (2008) refer to as government at a distance. 
Miller and Rose use ‘government at a distance’ to refer to liberal modes of rule 
characterised by the use of indirect mechanisms that link “calculations at one place to 
action at another.” This is done using a “delicate affiliation of a loose assemblage of 
agents and agencies” that come to agree that their “problems or goals are intrinsically 
linked [and] that their interests are consonant” and for this to occur, actors must go 
through a process of translation in which they become “able to require or count upon a 
particular way of thinking” (p.34).  For liberalism, this ‘particular way of thinking’, is of 
the market as a site of ‘veridiction’, or where truth is spoken (Foucault, 2008, p.56).  
Neoliberalism’s contribution to this, was to emphasise the “language of enterprise” 
(Miller and Rose, 2008, p.49) which aims at “possessing the future in advance by 
objectivising it” (Lanci, 2015, p.102), presenting a choice of alternative and mutually 
exclusive ends, of which an individual must use their ‘scarce means’ responsibly to 
achieve (Robbins, 1935, p.15). This established a dispositif of social debt, fuelled by the 
‘memory of the future’ (Lanci, 2015, p.108), which entails the ‘fear of missing out’ as 
well as other traditional conceptions of financial debt - and transferring the responsibility 
of public debt onto the body social. This economic ‘game’ is designed to allow automatic 
indirect government, so as to reduce state intervention.  
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This rationality encourages individuals to be ‘entrepreneurs’ and make use of ‘self-
knowledge’ to construct a “lifestyle through the world of goods” (Miller and Rose, p.49), 
therefore stimulating market competition – the market itself having become a game of 
‘non-exclusion’ whereby only the minimum protections are required to ensure that “no 
one player risks losing everything” (Foucault, 2008, p.202). Consequently, the actions of 
individuals are structured within a field of risk, where each choice and decision can be 
defined as how financially ‘risky’ it is.  
This ‘language of enterprise’ has spread beyond the government of individuals, and 
allowed the market to be bent back upon the state, in what Mitchell Dean (2010) refers 
to as reflexive government. This refers to the application of neoliberal rationalities of 
economic risk to areas of social government. He argues that this is achieved through 
various ‘managerial doctrines’, which he categorises as technologies of performance 
including:  
Cost of management accounting, the devolution of financial responsibility onto budget units or cost 
centres, the establishment of quasi-markets, or the various uses of audit are all forms of indirect 
regulation of other regimes of regulation, whether they be of the school, the hospital, the 
university, the delivery of home care or child services, as well as of the corporation. (p.225) 
This same sentiment was shared by Deleuze (1990, p.4) when he stated that such 
techniques may express new freedoms, but they could also come to “participate in new 
mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of confinements” through the 
“closure of the future”, and the capitalist annexation of time (Lanci, 2015, p.112). 
The plasticity of neoliberalism allows any object to become captured in this apparatus, 
since it “both feeds on and reproduces the moods of populations” (Fisher, 2009, p.36). 
As stated, it does not require a transcendental truth or a specific end goal to function, 
other than the translation of social relations and government into numbers, and 
subsequently into the language of the market. Therefore, neoliberal algorithmic 
governmentality does produce the “subjects it needs” (contra Rouvroy, 2012, p.151), 
because it only requires those subjects to participate in the market - with a modicum of 
self-knowledge - whether accurate or not.  
This can, and has, affected many areas of public governance, but this paper focuses on 
the law. Whilst we have not seen a truly neoliberal court, yet, it is possible to speak of 
the ways in which algorithmic government is pushing things in this direction. We can see 
this in terms of the reconfiguration of certain legal processes, including changes to legal 
knowledge construction, the subsumption of legal actors into algorithmic operations, and 
the introduction of new technologies to facilitate the automation of various workloads. 
For example, the American criminal justice system is gradually being transformed into an 
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experimental laboratory for algorithmic governmentality. There are two excellent and 
alarming examples of this, both of which involve an appraisal of future potentialities.  
In a report drawn up by the Executive Office of the President (2016, p.19-22), numerous 
allusions are made to the adoption of ‘predictive policing’ in a various states across the 
US. These aim to “identify patterns in criminal activity in order to allocate scarce 
resources more efficiently” through the use of algorithmic analysis. Such programmes 
are already in action, yet the report acknowledges both that “criminal justice data is 
notoriously poor” – because it is often inherently subjective – and that the use of 
historical information has the potential to “perpetuate policing practices that are not 
sufficiently attuned to community needs.” The expectation of such programs is that 
having officers at the “proposed place and time will deter or detect criminal activity” 
(Ratcliffe, 2015) 
When dealing with big data, the notion of not being ‘sufficiently attuned to community 
needs’ softens the blow of the real threat, in that it could perpetuate already existing 
discrimination, as discussed earlier. Predictive policing is being trialled by the LAPD, a 
force notorious for previous accusations of racial bias. To begin a trial in an already 
contentious area like this - using questionable historical data, that breaches both 
assumptions referred to above - demonstrates that preference is given to resource and 
time management, and therefore market-based reasoning, in place of due critique. 
Should repurposed user data from technologies like the Internet of Things be added into 
the (already flawed) mix, matters are likely to become even more complex. 
Algorithms are also being used for risk assessment in U.S. courts. In Broward County, 
Florida, the task of assessing risk has been outsourced to Northpointe, a private 
company providing decision support to multiple local criminal justice systems across the 
USA. A study by ProPublica has revealed that mistakes were made on the assessment of 
both white and black defendants – aiming to predict future crimes within two years after 
the assessment, a benchmark set by the company itself - but with a clear disparity. 
Black defendants were wrongly identified as future criminals “at almost twice the rate as 
white defendants” and white defendants “were mislabelled as low risk more often than 
black defendants” (Angwin et al., 2016). Identification as high-risk can lead to increased 
bail bonds and sentences. Section 203 of the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 
2015 (awaiting approval of the Senate at time of writing) legislates for a similar, 
singular, ‘Post-Sentencing Risk and Needs Assessment System’ to be implemented 
across the United States. 
Northpointe refuses to disclose the method of calculation, but the score derives from 137 
questions, none of them include queries on race. Once again, resource management and 
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efficiency are the driving goals, at the expense of due process (Northpointe’s software 
reportedly costs a measly $22,000 a year).  Here, not only has data been adapted from 
a third party, but that same party has become an arm of the justice system itself, in a 
process of privatisation that implements neoliberal government at a distance.  
If algorithms are beginning to take their place as the providers of quasi-expert testimony 
in the courtroom, does that in itself represent a warning shot for the coming shift in how 
the law operates? Algorithms are security mechanisms in that, among other things, they 
determine the progression of phenomena “within acceptable limits and around an 
average that will be considered optimal for social functioning” – delimited by ‘risk’ 
(Foucault, 2007, p.5; p.66). But, if they are merely perpetuating pre-existing biases 
within the system, albeit more efficiently by bypassing socio-legal critique, should that 
really be considered socially acceptable? Is it the economic ‘operationality’ that is 
defining these ‘acceptable’ limits? How can legal actors ensure due process and critique? 
 
The ‘ghost’ in the legal machine 
As argued by Morison and Leith (1992), legal knowledge is: “a process, not a corpus”; 
strategic and negotiable”; a dialogic one where “timetables are brought to bear”, and 
that courts require “truth within given times” (p.195); meaning the best kind of legal 
point is the “one that works”, and gets the job done persuasively and efficiently (p.95).  
Having explored the examples above, algorithms are clearly attractive to law, because 
they can reduce the time needed to close cases. But the ‘persuasive’ element is also 
crucial, as it touches directly upon the law’s specific performance as a ‘truth regime’; 
requiring arrival at an acceptable ‘truth’, in the knowledge that the established ‘facts’ 
were negotiated at the same time as the applicable rules, and as part of a highly social 
process (p.78). Objective facts are not always needed, or even desired, as is 
demonstrated by subjective tests in UK criminal law. For example in R v Owino [1996] 2 
Cr App R 128, it was established that (objectively) reasonable force for self-defence is 
permitted in the circumstances, as the defendant subjectively believes them to be. To 
obtain these insights, information is required, and technology changes how this 
information is collected and treated.  
A norm-setting reciprocity or ‘modulation’ exists between digital technologies and social 
institutions, like that of law, meaning the legal system continually mutates to meet 
particular needs of our new digital society, and vice versa (Deleuze, 1992, p.4). Having 
invented these new technologies, they in turn ‘(re)invent’ us (Hildebrandt, 2015, p.28), 
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whether this was the initial purpose or not. Or, in the language of governmentality, the 
conduct of one governmental technology mutates to suit the conduct of the other.   
As attested by McGinnis and Wasick (2010, p.993), law is an information technology 
itself, facilitating the flow of information from the governing to the governed, and from 
the governed to the governing, as it “incorporates new data from legal disputes”. They 
make the point that “the nature of legal [knowledge] production depends on the 
technology of its age” and give the example of computerised document searches and 
organisation, now standard in litigation proceedings, because of the ever increasing 
volume of digital documents or ‘electronically stored information’ (ESI) (p.1000).  
This is currently moving towards the next step - as demonstrated by the automation of 
paralegal work - using artificial intelligence programmes like ROSS, a re-purposed 
version of IBM’s Watson for document discovery. If you “ask direct questions”, ROSS will 
“find you answers from the law in seconds” and it is also hoped that it will help “craft 
and practice oral arguments” in the future. [3]  
While the potential of ROSS is speculative for now, algorithmic analysis is already 
increasingly a more important type of expertise in the world of litigation, as it can 
provide insights on judiciary behaviour, ‘timing analytics’ for courts, and the legal history 
of opposing counsel, witnesses, and even represented parties (Dysart, 2013; Dixon, 
2016).  
There are two interlinking rationalities for incorporating such technologies into the world 
of law. Firstly, they enable processes of financial risk management that allows: case 
selection procedures to weed out those that are more ‘risky’, cost reduction for firms in 
litigation procedures, the automation of tedious research normally reserved for entry-
level positions, thus reducing labour costs, and ultimately reducing the time needed to 
build a legal argument. Every firm and individual justice system therefore acts with the 
entrepreneurial spirit that neoliberalism so values, organised around the language of 
enterprise, in ways almost no different to the examples of targeted advertising 
mentioned above. This leads to the second point: that algorithms also increase the 
‘persuasiveness’ of legal arguments, because they approach the construction of legal 
knowledge in novel ways.  
Algorithms are, in a sense, the perfect witness (if involved in advocacy, and the 
knowledge produced suits your argument). Big data makes use of the ubiquitous and 
pervasive data collection of smart technologies; and its ‘relational’ character can 
facilitate the ‘telling of a story’ by building a persuasive, ‘immediately operational’ 
narrative that stages a form of reality - amongst the drama of case-building and the 
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theatre of the courtroom. Correlations between different data sources can be used to 
establish locations, interests, intentions, and more (Jackson et al., 2017, p.7). Whether 
this is accurate is almost irrelevant so long as it persuades, as an algorithmic confessor 
in the battle for production of ‘truth’, within a legal investigation (Foucault, 1995, p.41). 
There are numerous ethical issues ready to be unpacked here, especially as this data 
was collected for different purposes. However, in a way, this is not so far from the 
common practice of private email disclosure in litigation procedures, which only a few 
years ago would have been looked at in the same way.  It also begs the (speculative) 
question as to whether this information could be used to determine guilt through risk 
profiles (presenting probabilities by percentage) in the future. After all, if the standard 
civil burden of proof in Anglo-American civil cases is on the balance of probabilities or 
“more probable than not” as Lord Denning put it in Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 
All ER 372, wouldn’t an algorithmic risk profile suit this perfectly? Perhaps, but it may 
also be a catalyst for direct translation with economic calculations, and therefore it 
further widens the scope for neoliberal risk management strategies of government, that 
are already taking hold of legal systems.  
Looking at this through the lens of neoliberal rationality however, it is the economics 
which take precedence. Algorithmic results therefore also persuade legal actors to use 
such technologies, within the financially risky game of legal practice, because they can 
focus upon material and financial concerns, providing solutions that ‘work’ and ‘get 
things done’ efficiently. The conduct of legal actors is conducted by economic ‘grids of 
intelligibility’ which may tease out new knowledge(s) from the world, but in doing so 
they necessarily filter out other potentialities (Foucault, 2003, p.226). 
There are various ways by which big data can become involved in a case. In UK civil 
cases, each party must disclose electronic information “on which he relies”, that which 
“adversely affects” their own or another party’s case, and that which will “support” 
another party’s case. There is also a requirement for a “reasonable” search to be made 
for any relevant documents (Civil Procedure Rules, sections 31.6 and 31.7). In a UK 
criminal case, a defendant may choose to disclose a defence statement or alibi, which 
could include big data analytics (under section 6 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996). This could be the case if the defendant wants to bring a level 
of ‘objectivity’ to the subjective tests mentioned above. Concepts of privacy and personal 
data take a backseat here, in a process where relevance is the deciding factor. [4]  
As famously stated by Holmes (1923): 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessity of the time; the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious; even the 
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prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story 
of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained 
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. (p.1) 
The law is a highly social process; not deterministic, but prone to accident, and capable 
of producing unintended effects. The only guaranteed ever-present characteristic in legal 
practice is the productive power of creativity, employed to satisfy the ‘felt necessities’ 
described above (Lefebvre, 2009, p.39). This is productive in the sense that it produces 
social norms, or ‘common denominators’ through the imposition of “purpose” over texts, 
data and traditions, by which an individual can evaluate one’s actions, or those of others 
(Ewald, 1990, p.152; Dworkin, 1986, p.228).  
We are at a point in algorithmic technology where it is possible to guide its use before 
“closure and stabilisation limit debate” on the subject (Ananny, 2016, p.97). Developing 
technologies often succumb to a ‘lock-in’ (Lanier, 2010, p.7), whereby one particular 
design or method of operation becomes standard. Big data has the potential though to 
create legal lock-in supported by a powerful truth regime with a ‘common-sense’ and 
‘objective’ approach (Kitchin, 2014, p.113); and enforced by a system of strong 
precedent, as “judges normally recognise a duty to continue rather than discard the 
practice they have joined” (Dworkin, 1986, p.87).  
The law is itself a technology of liberal government, ensuring the “existence and practice 
of economic freedom” (Foucault, 2008, p.86), and it ‘conducts conduct’ as a result. If 
legal actors want the law to be viewed as a respectable institution that provides social 
justice, they must consider the use of algorithms and big data with creative critique;  
looking beyond the statistics of economic performance, and the effectiveness of an 
algorithmic argument (granted, this is much easier said than done). Algorithmic evidence 
does not only improve an argument, but it also adds to the increasing indiscriminate 
quantification and metamorphosis of the ‘lived world’ into the staged reality of neoliberal 
economics. Such critique could even manifest itself as: an advocate choosing to appease 
an opposition counsel’s attempts at using algorithmic evidence, if only to pick apart its 
accuracy in trial. Whatever happens, the legal future is luckily not yet determined.  
 
Conclusions  
Both algorithms and the law are instruments of government, able to implement political 
rationalities and organise the ‘conduct of conduct’. Because of this characteristic, as 
technologies, the ways in which they can be used are not pre-determined, meaning they 
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are susceptible to mutation by a variety of actors. Neoliberal economics and risk 
management strategies are now riding the wave of this malleability in both areas, which 
as has been shown, are ever more likely to work in tandem. This partnership works 
because both the law and algorithms work within assemblages of knowledge discovery 
that come to accepted agreements and particular presentations of ‘truth’ as a basis for 
action. They can on the other hand have determinative effects, by shifting power 
relations with normative force, both intentionally and unintentionally. Given that both 
can produce detrimental economic or legal effects for a person who has been incorrectly 
profiled, creative critique is vital, so as to point out any existing contradictions or 
inaccuracies of the accepted reality.  
This paper has clearly dealt with very conceptual and theoretical issues, which although 
it allows exploration of the pertinent topics at an abstract level, it is mainly informed by 
the relevant literature and public-facing descriptions of various technologies in 
development, along with limited personal employment within e-discovery for large-scale 
commercial disputes. However this is conceptual style is intended, as a basis for future 
research in the hope that this will be the starting point for ethnographic research into 
algorithmic and legal practices - so as to gain a greater insight into the motivations of 
those who are directly involved in the day-to-day operation of these governmental 
technologies. This could involve talking to lawyers, judges, administrators, developers, 
or even defendants that have gone through these processes.  
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